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Abstract:
There are several identifiable and ubiquitous reasons why U.S. democracy building
interventions fail abroad. The literature has shown that the principal reason that U.S. democracy
building efforts fail is that they prioritize seeking immediate stability over creating long-lasting
support for liberal democratic institutions. Additionally, contributing factors are also: lack of
knowledge of the political history of a nation, lack of knowledge of the complexities within the
domestic politics of each nation, lack of local and grassroots inclusion in planning processes, and
the use of destabilizing covert and overt operations in an attempt at immediate results, with little
force put behind rebuilding efforts. This paper will discuss these failures through the case
studies of the U.S. interventions in Chile and Afghanistan. These represent both ends of the
spectrum of U.S. intervention, and the different methods of democracy promotion. The United
States has tried to replicate its successes in Germany and Japan, in countries with very different
histories and comparatively limited development. Utilizing the same methodology for all foreign
interventions, dooms the democratization process before it can even begin. By neglecting to
account for the specificities of each case, U.S. foreign interventions are incapable of supporting
the formation of stable democracies.
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1.

Introduction
1.1.

Globalization

The continual progress of globalization implicates the inevitability that certain nations
will become involved in the domestic politics of other nations. The United States particularly has
a long history of performing military interventions in foreign nations, all in the name of
democracy building. Since the start of the post-World War II era, the U.S. has been the primary
hegemonic force on the international playing field, if not the global hegemon. In this respect, it is
not surprising that the United State would pursue personal interests through the domestic politics
of other nations.
The most profound example of this is the rise in democracy promotion and democratic
interventions. However, these operations, both covert and overt, fail to create stable democracies
in their respective nations. In his work, Advancing Democracy Abroad, Michael McFaul details
the outcomes of every major and covert U.S. intervention. According to the data, seventy percent
of these major interventions fail as attempts to foster democracy and fall to autocracy within ten
years. The track record for successful covert U.S. operations is slightly higher, but still at a
dismal thirty two percent.1 The subsequent question then becomes; why do these interventions
fail, and if they are so unsuccessful why do we pursue them?
Historical evidence of U.S. foreign interventions paves the way for some of these
answers. The main causes of failure in these interventions and democracy building efforts is that
they prioritize seeking immediate stability over creating long-lasting support for liberal
democratic institutions. Additional factors that contribute to this are: lack of knowledge of the
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political history of target nations, lack of knowledge of the complexities within the domestic
politics of each nation, lack of local and grassroots inclusion in planning processes, and the use
of destabilizing covert and overt operations in an attempt at immediate results, with little force
put behind rebuilding efforts. These efforts have been as a whole, unsuccessful; however, the
primary reason they remain at the forefront of U.S. foreign policy is the concept behind the
theory of liberal democratic peace.
1.2.

Liberal Democratic Peace Theory

Democracies are widely regarded across the international system as being the most
preferable method of governance, for both the citizens of these nations and the international
community as a whole. In their article, "Against All Odds?: The History of Imposed Democracy
and the Future of Iraq and Afghanistan," Enterline, Andrew J., and J. Michael Greig discuss the
proven global benefits of democracy. They state, “... democratic regimes are found to be more
prosperous, are unlikely to engage in militarized conflict with each other, exhibit significantly
greater respect for human rights, and proliferate geographically through ‘‘snowballing”.”2 This
evidence for the benefits of democracy further promote international support for democracy
promotion. However, the most prominent argument for the continuation of democracy promotion
is the “Liberal Democratic Peace Theory.” This theory explores the idea that liberal democracies
will not go to war with each other, which would entail the end of major war. While seeming to
be naively optimistic, this theory has yet to be disproven. With war defined as armed conflict
between two opposing nations, there have never been two liberal democracies who have gone to
war. It is important to specify that this theory does not claim that liberal democracies will not
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engage in warfare at all, only that they will not engage in conflict with each other. In his work,
Cultural Evolution: People's Motivations are Changing, and Reshaping the World, Ronald
Inglehart further explains the nuances of this theory. He states, “... disputes continue over the
question of whether modern democracies’ prosperity and interdependence accounts for their
peacefulness, or whether there is something inherent in democracy itself that makes democracies
less warlike.”3 Therefore, the exact cause of the prosperous nature of liberal democracies remains
unproven, but the overall result of peace between these nations is indisputable. Regardless of
whether or not the root causes of this stability are inherent to democracies as a system of
governance, the evidence shows that democracy promotion is a clear method for promoting
global peace.
Aside from the ultimate goal of minimizing warfare, creating stable states poses other
gains for the global system. In his article, “The Imperative of State Building,” Francis Fukuyama
states, “Weak or failed states are close to the root of many of the world’s most serious problems,
from poverty and AIDS to drug trafficking and terrorism.”4 Instability at an individual state
level, inevitably grows to encompass broader global regions. Therefore, it seems imperative to
promote democracy in order to further stabilize global politics. This concept then provides
incentive for democracy promotion, as support for liberal democracies are in the inherent best
interests of every nation.
1.2.1. The Consequences of Failure
It is undisputed that promoting liberal democracies is in the best interest of the
international community, and, as stated, this ideology often leads to foreign interventions. These
Inglehart, Ronald. Cultural Evolution: People's Motivations are Changing, and Reshaping the World. Cambridge
University Press, 2018.
4
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interventions are also, unsurprisingly, commonly spearheaded by the United States. The results
of such interventions often reflect new cases of “imposed democracies.” Enterline and Greig
define this process:
... imposed democratic regimes are democratic governments installed by a foreign power in which
the foreign power plays an important role in the establishment, promotion, and maintenance of the
institutions of government. In this sense, the imposition of these democratic regimes represents a
more significant and costly way of altering the policies of another state that involves more than
merely encouraging or facilitating leadership change, but necessitates restructuring entirely the
domestic political system of the target state.5

By definition, the process of imposing democracy implies an investment of a vast amount of time
and resources by the imposing nation, usually the United States, into the target nation.
Additionally, there are different types of imposed democracies. No two nations experience the
same political turmoil; therefore, no two nations will experience the same processes of
democracy building. Enterline and Greig make this distinction;
Imposed democratic regimes can be installed following the defeat of a state in a war such as the
familiar examples of post-World War II West Germany and Japan in which a foreign power
occupies a state military, removes the government, and establishes entirely new democratic
political institutions. Iraq and Afghanistan, of course, are similar cases in this respect. Other
democratic polities can be imposed by an outside power more incrementally, through a colonial
process, for example, in which the metropole establishes the democratic regime to govern a colony
after independence, or via covert activity, such as support of a coup d’e´tat.6

Following this definition, both covert operations such as those in Chile during the Cold War, and
overt military operation in Afghanistan would qualify as imposed democracies. However, as
previously stated, many democratic interventions statistically end in failure. These failures have
proven to cause long-term ramifications for the fate of democracy in these regions. There are
several challenges to supporting democracy promotion in nations that have not previously
developed democratic institutions. Enterline and Greig state, “... scholarship warns of potential
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negative byproducts from newly democratized states, such as regional instability, tendencies
toward aggressive foreign policies, the difficulty of grafting democratic institutions on to
ethnically diverse societies, as well America’s poor track record of transplanting democracy.”7 In
the process of democracy building, there are intense ramifications for getting the process wrong.
For example, Enterline and Greig note that, “A prior failed imposed strong democracy reduces
the future probability of strong democracy by nearly 50%. A failed imposed weak democracy
sets back the future cause of strong democracy even further, reducing the probability of its
emergence by 70%.”8 Therefore, a lack of success in imposed democracy building can stunt the
development of an organic democracy indefinitely. This raises the stakes immensely when
considering foreign interventions for the sake of creating stable democracies. In order to
determine what creates a successful imposed democracy, it is imperative to look at not only the
successes of foreign interventions, but also the common themes among the failures.
2.

U.S. Ideology
2.1.

Successes in Germany and Japan

Commonly cited as evidence for the success of U.S. democratic interventions and state
building are its early successes, primarily those in Germany and Japan post-World War II. Both
of these nations could be classified as “failed states” at the end of the war. However, to compare
the failed state of East Germany to that of Afghanistan is completely lacking in understanding
the circumstances affecting each individual state. The United States has tried to replicate its
successes in Germany and Japan, in countries with very different histories and comparatively
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limited development. Using the same methods in all interventions, dooms the democratization
process before it can even begin. By ignoring the nuances and complexities of each individual
case, the U.S. is fundamentally incapable of supporting the formation of stable democracies.
There were several factors aiding the success of U.S. operations in both Germany and
Japan. The first being, the complex political and economic development of these nations prior to
the war. These were world powers that lost a major war, not failed states that fell to corruption or
internal fragmentation. Von Hippel states in her paper, “Democracy by force: A renewed
commitment to nation building”: “... it is also important to note that Allied success in
implementing democratic reforms was enhanced by respect for education and high literacy rates,
advanced levels of industrialization, and, of course, unconditional surrender.”9 This explores the
idea that the U.S. efforts in Germany and Japan are fundamentally distinct from later
interventions for a multitude of reasons. However, the most poignant being, the post-war
conditions of both Germany and Japan.
2.2.

Subsequent failures

The most obvious, but possibly also the most influential difference regarding U.S.
interventions in Germany and Japan in comparison to the nation’s later interventions, were the
unconditional surrenders of Germany and Japan. These nations essentially consented to U.S.
interventions in their domestic affairs by the sheer virtue of their surrender. This sharply
contrasts with other U.S. interventions abroad, in nations that did not comply with U.S. actions.
It is impossible to compare the outcomes of planned and accepted interventions such as those in
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Germany and Japan with those of covert and subversive natures and those which heavily
militarized nations such as in Chile and Afghanistan.
Additionally, it is not reasonable to promote the intervention methods used in Germany
and Japan as the standard that should be used across the world. This is because of the unique
case studies of these nations as being post-World War II world powers. The case studies of
Germany and Japan are unique in this respect primarily because it inherently means that both
nations had previously constructed highly developed political and economic systems in their
respective countries. The speed and success of these interventions can also be attributed to the
geopolitical contexts of both nations. Being that Germany and Japan were influential nations on
the global stage, it was in the best interests of other nations to aid in their redevelopment.
Therefore, it wasn’t just the burden of the U.S. to carry the operations, other allied nations, such
as Great Britain and France helped shoulder the weight. This is especially important to factor
when considering the costs associated with these interventions of development. Von Hippel
states, “... in 1948, the first year of the Marshall Plan (1948-1952), aid distributed to 16 European
states amounted to 13 percent of the entire U.S. budget. This total did not even include all costs
incurred during the German occupation and any of the occupation costs in Japan.”10 The costs,
both fiscally and in physical boots on the ground, required to fully stabilize and democratize a
nation were allotted to both the interventions in Germany and Japan. However, in more recent
cases, the cost benefit analysis of such operations is greatly reduced.
The U.S. is now much less likely to provide the necessary resources to its interventions
abroad. The primary focus of foreign interventions has shifted within U.S. politics. The ideal
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outcome has transitioned from being stabilized and supported democracy, to the fastest and least
extensive methods to reach stability in whichever manner it can be achieved in the target nation.
Von Hippel describes this transitional process in her statement regarding Germany and Japan;
This would include disarmament, demobilization, and demining as integral components with the
aim of reintegrating militia and soldiers into civil society, as indeed occurred in a thorough manner
in Germany and Japan… There is no political will in the United States to become so extensively
involved in demilitarization due to the fear of casualties, yet until control over security is
reestablished, state reconstruction cannot be successfully realized.11

The realization of what efforts must be made to achieve success in foreign interventions does not
necessarily bring them to action. This decline in willingness for long term engagement is one of
the fundamental reasons for the subsequent failures in U.S. interventions. The change in method
is palpable when exploring cases such as U.S. covert operations in Chile and the heavily
politicized militarization operations in Afghanistan.
2.2.1.

Common Themes

One prominent theme was the transition of the mentality and methodology of U.S.
interventions. Many key factors from the interventions in Germany and Japan remained.
However, there was now more reluctance for integral and committed military involvement. Von
Hippel draws upon this idea, “A conspicuous change has been the gradual reduction of U.S.
military control over nation-building activities, with Germany and Japan representing the peak.”
12

This change signaled a decline in committed efforts to democracy promotion. The U.S.

continued to further its democratic rhetoric, but became hesitant when in came to long term
planning.
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This new application of old methodologies became increasingly problematic as the U.S.
entered the Cold War with the Soviet Union. In this period, democracy promotion became
essential to national security objectives, not simply a matter of humanitarian affairs. However, in
the struggle to gain global allies during this conflict, the target nations were those that suffered.
Fukuyama describes the consequential fallout of the Cold War, “The end of the Cold War left a
band of failed or weak states stretching from the Balkans through the Caucasus, the Middle East,
Central Asia, and South Asia.”13 Through the quest for anti-socialist allies, the U.S. actually
aided in the failure of states. In covert operations, such as those employed in Chile, the U.S.
actively propped up fascist dictatorships. Stability and U.S. national security interests were
prioritized over democratic institutions and values. Similarly, the beginning of state failure in
Afghanistan also began in the Cold War era. This actually started with Soviet operations, that the
U.S. began countering with similar covert methods. The instability caused by these surface level
and short term interventions led to the eventual U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan in
2001, all in the name of promoting democracy.
3.

Case Studies of Chile and Afghanistan
These operations in Chile and Afghanistan have not only have failed to bring stable

democracies, but also have led to long-term political instability, human rights violations, and
inherent distrust of the United States. The case studies of Chile and Afghanistan appear to be
different situations, if not even unrelated cases. However, these cases represent the full range of
failed tactics used by the U.S. in instances of foreign intervention. Initially, these case studies
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seem to be different in nature and in resolution. However, the root causes that cause the failure of
the creation of stable democracies, remain the same across this spectrum.
3.1.

Chile overview

Chile represents the U.S. pattern of using covert tactics to subvert the political tactics of a
country. This strategy was used abundantly in many countries across Latin America during the
Cold War era. During this period, the covert tactics used in Chile were not particularly
innovative or shocking in their implementation. Kornbluh states:
Nixon's bald directive on Chile was neither unparalleled nor unprecedented. Throughout the
nineteenth and early twentieth-century history of U.S. policy of toward Latin America. presidents
frequently authorized overt military efforts to remove governments deemed undesirable to U.S.
economic and political interests. After the signing of the United Nations charter in 1948, which
highlighted nonintervention and respect for national sovereignty, the White House made
ever-greater use of the newly created Central Intelligence Agency to assert U.S. hegemonic
designs.14

With conciseness in mind, this case overview solely focuses on U.S. interventions in Chile
beginning with the 1970 presidential elections and ending with the initial support for Pinochet’s
regime.
Additionally, it is important to note that currently in global affairs, Chile is regarded as
having one of the most stable democracies. Therefore, the argument is not that U.S. interventions
completely prevented Chile from achieving a stable democratic status or caused Chile to become
a failed state. Rather, that U.S. efforts beginning in 1970 were unwarranted and destructive, with
negative ramifications that affected Chile and its people for years to come. These interventions
impeded such democratic development, and stunted the development that was already in motion.
The interventions executed by the United States hindered Chile’s progress as a nation, and
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allowed for rampant and unchecked human rights abuses in the nation through the propping up
of an autocratic regime.
3.1.1. Early Covert Operations
The beginning of U.S. involvement in Chile was seen through its covert operations in
relation to the 1970 presidential election. In Chile, the democratically elected president, Salvador
Allende, caused concern among many U.S. leaders. He proposed to implement several socialist
measures in his country; and at the height of the Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet
Union, this raised a red flag for the United States. President Nixon’s mentality surrounding the
situation can best be summarized as, “We are making a major covert effort to reduce chances of
Chile being the first American country to elect an avowed Marxist president. Our well concealed
program embraces special economic assistance to assure stability, aid to the armed forces and
police to maintain order, and political action and propaganda tied closely to Frei's campaign.”15
Chile then becomes an interesting case study as it is one of the few nations to democratically
elect a socialist leader, without any type of socialist revolution. It is bold to assume that a
socialist president inherently means that democracy in that nation is doomed, but during the
height of Cold War tensions the U.S. was especially concerned. The national security threat
posed by this new socialist regime was a key motivating factor in U.S. operations in Chile.
Many politicians and scholars, including Henry Kissinger, believed undoubtedly that
democracy could not survive in Chile under these conditions.16 They believed that democracy in
Chile was simply too new and unstable to weather this new socialist leadership. However, not
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every U.S. official shared this same ideology. Viron Vaky, Kissinger's top aide on Latin America
sent him a top-secret cable stating:
"It is far from given that wisdom would call for covert action programs; the consequences could
be disastrous. The cost-benefit-risk ratio is not favorable."... Vaky presented Kissinger with a
SECRET/SENSITIVE memorandum summarizing a CIA position paper on Chile along with
analytical comment, conclusions, and recommendations. "Military action is impossible,"... "We
have no capability to motivate or instigate a coup,"... "any covert effort to stimulate a military
takeover is a nonstarter." Success in blocking Allende would lead to possible "widespread
violence and even insurrection," requiring an escalating U.S. involvement in Chile to prop up a
substitute government; failure could strengthen and radicalize Allende's forces, and "would be this
administration's Bay of Pigs."17

There was clear dissent between high profile U.S. officials, yet the perceived threat to
hemispheric norms was supported over the well being of the nation of Chile.
Moreover, there was no indication that the Chilean people were “in need” of foreign
intervention. Allende was winning the required votes, in a democratically sound election. As the
U.S. was beginning to devise intrusive plans to intervene in another nation’s government, the
atmosphere in Chile was one of contentment; “...there existed no reason, no justification, nor
even a pretext for the military to move to block Allende's Popular Unity coalition from taking
office. In reality, the vast majority of Chileans were at peace with the outcome of their political
process. "There is now no peg for a military move," as the Station reported on September 29, "in
face of the complete calm prevailing throughout the country."”18 The only nation concerned with
the Chilean elections was the United States. Therefore, in efforts that ultimately prioritized
stability over democracy, the U.S. spearheaded covert operations that led to the ousting of
Allende.
3.1.2. Destabilization
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However, early U.S. efforts to undermine the popularity of Allende and his party were
unsuccessful. This drove the United States to become more heavily involved in and invested with
the political situation in Chile. It was no longer feasible for the U.S. to implement a quick
operation, they had to completely alter the political climate of Chile. Kornbluh described the
scenario as, “Rather than a small group of covert operatives trying to stimulate a military move
in a short period of time, most of the U.S. government would now be involved in a long-term,
expanded effort to destabilize the Chilean government- economically, politically, and militarily.”
19

This began the shift in United States interventions in Chile. The U.S. was now beyond

influencing voters through propaganda and supplying funds to preferred political groups, it was
now aiming for the total destabilization of Chile as a nation. This was, of course, all executed
under the guise of protecting Chile’s democratic institutions. Years after “Project FUBELT” was
put into action, President Ford himself argued, “... that the United States had acted to preserve
Chilean democracy. “The effort that was made in this case,” he told the press, “was to help assist
the preservation of opposition newspapers and electronic media and to preserve oppositional
political parties.”... This was… “in the best interests of the people of Chile and certainly in our
best interests.”20 However, this mentality was, again, not universal across all the top U.S.
officials. Many were vehemently opposed to the idea of such an intrusive operation into the
electoral systems and government institutions of another nation. There was additionally a
concern for the image of the United States in the international sphere if information about this
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operation were to be leaked. For the U.S. to intervene in Chile, would be a gross violation of the
ideals that the United States claims to hold;
... the Bureau of Inter-American affairs argued that were Washington to openly violate its
announced policy of “respect for the outcome of democratic elections it would- Reduce our
credibility throughout the world… increase nationalism directed against us… be used by the
Allende Government to consolidate its position with the Chilean people and to gain influence in
the rest of the hemisphere… and move the Allende Government to seek even closer relations with
the USSR than it might have initially contemplated.”21

It was a well known consensus among U.S. officials that if news of this operation were released
to the public, the United States would face repercussions from the international community.
The U.S. continued to promote the cultivation of a “coup climate” in Chile through any
means they had available. The prominent facet of their methods for anti-Allende propaganda was
the publication, El Mercurio. While the U.S. continually denied having any involvement in the
coup itself, it did admit to some of their covert operations. Regarding El Mercurio, “In
admission that the U.S. covert operations had directly contributed to the overthrow of Allende,
the CIA asserted that the propaganda effort, in which El Mercurio was the dominant actor,
“played a significant role in setting the stage for the military coup of 11 September 1973.”22
Eventually, the creation of a “coup climate” in Chile was successful. The economy was down
and other political leaders were becoming more bold. It would seem that the U.S. efforts were a
success. However, the next issue the U.S. needed to tackle was preventing any type of
information leak of its operations in Chile.
The fear of a leak however, soon became a reality for the United States. In an effort to
further economically destabilize Chile, the U.S. partnered with several corporations, including
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the International Telephone and Telegraph company. While the U.S. was in the midst of denying
involvement in Chile, the ITT revealed condemning evidence of U.S. involvement. Kornbluh
describes these as, “The ITT records- twenty-four secret documents totaling seventy-nine pages
of strategy papers, memoranda of conversations, and meeting notes- candidly charted the intrigue
of covert corporate collaboration with the CIA, White House, and embassy officials to provoke
economic chaos and subvert Chilean democracy in 1970 and early 1971.”23 The response to these
records was as negative as one would expect. There was little recourse that the U.S. could take in
avoiding responsibility in the Chilean matter, and, as predicted, the image of the U.S. in the
international sphere was diminished. After the death of Allende, “International reaction to the
coup was immediate, widespread, and overwhelmingly condemnatory. Numerous governments
denounced the military takeover; massive protests were held throughout Latin America.”24 It was
clear that a coup had been aided by a foreign entity to oust a democratically elected leader.
However, unfortunately for the people of Chile, U.S. involvement in their politics did not end
with Allende’s death.
3.1.3. Moving Towards Authoritarianism
After the success of the coup that effectively ended the power of Allende’s party, in
methods that rejected U.S. democratic ideology; the U.S. then backed the authoritarian Augusto
Pinochet, who became president of Chile in 1974. This led to numerous human rights violations
in the nation and an impenetrable autocratic regime that lasted until 1990. The U.S. then
continued to support Pinochet during his rule, again prioritizing the new “stability” of Chile over
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the promotion of true liberal democratic values. The U.S. was hyper-aware of the atrocities being
committed by the Pinochet regime, “But the new secretary of state made his position clear. The
U.S. would not defend atrocities by the new regime, but "we should not support moves against
them by seeming to disassociate ourselves from the Chileans." As he admonished: "1 think. we
should understand our policy- that however unpleasant they act, this government is better for us
than Allende was."25 The United States, in a rejection of democratic values, openly supported a
dictatorship that it helped put into power. Not only did the United States help Pinochet rise to
power, but it also helped to prop up his regime. The U.S. poured an exorbitant amount of
resources into Chile in order to “stabilize” the new regime and rectify the economic damage that
resulted from U.S. sanctions during the Allende period. This intervention was, of course,
rationalized by the U.S.:
Almost overnight, Washington reopened the spigot of bilateral and multilateral economic
assistance to Santiago. In every category of direct and indirect bilateral and multilateral economic
and military assistance to Chile, U.S. aid rose dramatically following the coup--marking the end of
the "invisible blockade" Nixon and Kissinger had used to undermine' the Allende government. "It
is quite apparent that Chile is going to need considerable aid,"Assistant Secretary Kubisch
declared to Congress on September 29, "and if it adopts a sensible government, I would expect
that aid to be given."26

However, the U.S. did not wait for a “sensible government” to emerge before dispensing aid, nor
did one ever emerge while Pinochet was in power. In fact, Kornbluh notes, “Pinochet's Chile not
only received far greater amounts of U.S. assistance than the Allende government; the military
regime obtained remarkable preferential treatment over all other countries in Latin America.”27 It
became essential for the U.S. that the Chilean people accepted their new government. This lead
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to a continuation of U.S. propaganda efforts in Chile. However, the focus had now shifted from
anti-Allende to pro-Pinochet.
The United States knew that in order for the newfound “stability” to survive in Chile, the
Chilean population needed to be in support of the new regime. Therefore, “They have tried to
present the junta in the most positive light for the Chilean public and to assist foreign journalists
in Chile to obtain facts about the local situation.... The project is therefore essential in enabling
the Station to mold Chilean public opinion in support of the new government. (Doc 4)”28
Especially amidst the human rights violations occurring in this period, it was essential that the
Pinochet regime be spinned as a regime of progress. However, as Pinochet’s regime progressed,
it became more and more evident that the U.S. was no longer prioritizing support for democracy
in Chile. It was no secret what was occurring in Chile, “Kissinger's aides informed him- in a
secret situation report attached to the classified memorandum, "Chilean Executions," alerting
him to hundreds of murders by the regime during its first weeks in power.”29 Yet, the United
States no longer seemed concerned with “the best interests of the Chilean people,” and
seemingly wanted to be able to wash its hands of any covert involvement in Chile’s institutions.
This led to a proposal to further prop up Pinochet’s government:
The debate over this $160,000 proposal at the highest levels of Kissinger's State Department
reflected U.S. determination to back a brutal military regime over even minimal support for me
party that had represented Washington's greatest hope for Chilean democracy since John F.
Kennedy's Alliance for Progress. Now that Allende was dead, the rationale for covert action to
"preserve Chile's democratic institutions" no longer seemed important to U.S. policy makers- even
as the regime that overthrew him was systematically dismantling those very institutions.30

Kornbluh, P. (2013). The Pinochet file: A declassified dossier on atrocity and accountability. New York: The
New Press.
29
Kornbluh, P. (2013). The Pinochet file: A declassified dossier on atrocity and accountability. New York: The
New Press.
30
Kornbluh, P. (2013). The Pinochet file: A declassified dossier on atrocity and accountability. New York: The
New Press.
28

19

Through support for Pinochet’s regime, the United States effectively implemented a new
government institution in Chile that actively contradicts the values that the United States is
supposed to promote. The United States did not save democracy in Chile, it dismantled it.
The backlash against the United States’ interventions in Chile was intense, both
internationally and externally. President Ford was left to handle the diplomatic crisis that began
under Nixon, “Ford became the first US. president to acknowledge, and defend, covert
operations against a democratically elected government- operations designed to be "plausibly
denied." Is it the policy of your administration to attempt to destabilize the governments of other
democracies?, a reporter asked the president… “31 There was soon a call within U.S. congress to
hold hearings on the Chilean interventions. Ford opposed these and claimed that such hearings
would only further tarnish the reputation of the United States. The hearings eventually came to
pass and revealed the true depth of U.S. involvement:
The hearings focused on Chile as an "example of the full range of covert action," Senator Church
explained in his opening remarks, which "permits the committee, the Senate, and the council' to
debate and decide the merits of future use of covert action as an instrument of U.S. foreign
policy." The select committee had taken "this unusual step," Senator Church noted, "because the
committee believes the American people must know and be able to judge what was undertaken by
their government in Chile. The nature and extent of the American role in the overthrow of a
democratically elected Chilean government are matters for deep and continuing public concern,"
he concluded. "This record must be set straight. "32

This sentiment was echoed by other U.S. officials with knowledge about the interventions. Henry
Kissinger continued to defend U.S. actions in Chile, but many soon began to dissociate from this
opinion; “Kennedy condemned the “continued silence of the government of the United States
which has not issued a single public expression of remorse over the military coup which toppled
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a democratically elected government, or over the deaths, beatings, brutality, and repression
which have occurred in that land.”33 The interventions by the United States in Chile were not
even unilaterally agreed upon across U.S. institutions, so it is difficult to continue the narrative
that U.S. involvement was inherently in the best interest of Chile.
It is not clear if democracy could have survived in Chile after the nation elected a
socialist president. Some form of foreign intervention may have been deemed necessary down
the line; but the situation was not nearly as dire as portrayed by Kissinger, nor did it warrant an
entire shift of regime. There was no immediate threat to the stability of Chile, and the U.S. led
efforts in this case actually halted democratic processes that were already in motion. The United
States allowed the panic stirred by the Cold War to intervene in the democratic processes of
another nation. Additionally, the support for Pinochet and his regime had long term ramifications
that still have a lasting impact on the development of Chile. Not only did the United States aid in
the imposition and propping up of an authoritarian regime, but in doing so it harmed not only
Chile and the success of its institutions, but also the international image of the United States. It
became clear that the United States did not have any qualms with interfering in the affairs of
another nation; “Washington's embrace of the regime had not only failed to ease repression in
Chile; it was costly to U.S. national interests, creating divisions with Western allies, jeopardizing
Congressional cooperation on other foreign assistance programs, and damaging America's moral
leadership in the Third World.”34 The U.S. acted in line with safeguarding personal political
interests, and the nation of Chile was worse off because of it. Additionally, the events in Chile
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created a sense of distrust in U.S. foreign policy from other nations, and the populous of the
U.S.; “"It is one more reason why much of the youth of the country is alienated from their
government and its foreign policy. Chile is just the latest example for a lot of people in this
country of the United States not being true to its values."”35 There were less invasive, and more
effective, methods the U.S. could have utilized in order to promote democratic ideals in Chile. In
its interventions in Chile, the United States turned its back on the fundamental values it is
supposed to uphold, and instead aided the creation of international instability.
3.2.

Afghanistan overview

The efforts of the United States in Afghanistan represent the U.S. pattern of more
militarily aggressive and in depth intervention in foreign nations. This tactic was primarily used
in present-day Middle East operations, especially in overt efforts to “rebuild” post-conflict states.
Like in the case of Chile, U.S. interventions in Afghanistan also began during Cold War activity.
However, at this time the method of intervention was primarily relegated to arming the rebel
groups who were fighting the Soviet forces currently occupying Afghanistan. The United States
wanted to prevent the Soviet Union from further expanding its global influence, but was not yet
ready to officially commit to military action in the region. This group that received arms from
the United States, the Mujahideen, later became the Taliban in Afghanistan, which soon became
the only form of “government institutions” functioning in Afghanistan. The control of the
Taliban in Afghanistan becomes the major separating factor between U.S. interventions in Chile
and Afghanistan, because of a greater concern for national security.
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The U.S. intervention in Afghanistan, beginning in 2001, was not initiated solely for the
purpose of democracy promotion, but also to protect national security interests. This added factor
of a threat to national security caused the involvement in Afghanistan to be inherently more
intense and hands-on. However, a politician cannot create a government any more than an
economist can create an economy. Therein lies the conflict in democracy promotion in
Afghanistan. There was instability caused through the conflict with the Taliban, but no viable
solutions available. The U.S. used a so-called “cookie cutter” approach to building democracy in
Afghanistan. This method disregarded any national, ethnic, or historical factors that could aid or
impede the success of democracy in the nation. It is impossible to simply “place” a democracy in
a region where structure and stability does not currently exist. In their article, “Democracy in
Afghanistan is wishful thinking,” Johnson and Mason state; “Afghan history demonstrates
conclusively and beyond dispute that legitimacy of governance there is derived exclusively from
Weber's first two sources: traditional (in the form of the monarchy and tribal patriarchies) and
religious.”36 The lack of nuance given to the specific political history of Afghanistan ultimately
prevented the success of nation building there before it even began. This approach, which has
been mimicked in other nations across the Middle East and beyond, only furthers instability and
local support for autocracies. Additionally, the more aggressive the “implementation” of a
western-style democratic system is, the less likely it is to succeed. In relation to U.S. intervention
efforts, Jason Brownlee discusses:
“…in the developing world, the more modest the goals, the more successful U.S. interventions
have been.” In fact, when American forces have stayed for several years as in Iraq and attempted a
wholesale restructuring of society, the results have been disappointing, leading Brownlee to
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conclude that “more is less.” For those cases in which “U.S. troops did not stick around to arbitrate
local politics or erect new governments from scratch,” history proves in fact that “less is more.”37

It is infinitely more effective for foreign powers to support democratic institutions through the
agency of the local powers. The process of democracy building is much more effective when
implemented using grassroots movements, with the support of the citizens.
It is also impossible to create an instantaneous replication of the perceived “ideal western
democracy.” Johnson and Mason also state:
This historical reality poses a major problem for the US. Democracy is not a coat of paint. A
feudal society in which women are still largely treated as property and literacy hovers below 10
percent in rural areas does not magically shortcut 400 years of political development and morph
into a democracy in a decade. The current government of Afghanistan's claim to legitimacy is
based entirely on a legal source – winning an election. Yet this has no historical basis for
legitimizing Afghan rule. The winner of today's election will largely be seen as illegitimate
because he is elected.38

A system or institution that has no roots in organic development by the local power is unlikely to
ever be accepted by the target nation. However, even considering the historical evidence
demonstrating that the survival of a democracy in Afghanistan is unlikely, there is still room for
hope. In their article "Defining success in Afghanistan- What can the United States accept,"
Biddle, Fotini, and F. Alexander Thier argue that democracy in Afghanistan is not impossible,
but countries like the United States may need to rethink their standards for this new democracy.
They state; “... it is a mistake to assume that Afghanistan is somehow ungovernable or that any
sacrifice would be wasted in the pursuit of an unachievable goal. Afghanistan's own history
offers ample evidence of the kind of stable, decentralized governance that could meet today's
demands without abandoning the country's current constitution.”39 This argument supports the
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idea that, at present, a replica of the “ideal western democracy” is not feasible for Afghanistan.
However, other forms of democracy would not only still be suitable in the eyes of the United
States, but would also be more realistic in the success of their implementation.
3.2.1. Defining Democracy
As stated, the historical and regional nuances are inherently tied to the potential success
of an imposed democracy in any nation. In their article "The Durability of Imposed Democracy,"
Enterline and Greig further analyze some of the key distinctions that determine the potential
success rate of these democracies. Specifically, they focus on the differences between what
caused success in Germany and Japan, and what is contributing to the failure in Afghanistan.
Enterline and Greig state:
For West Germany, a key reason for the durability of its imposed democracy is its prior
democratic experience. Among imposed democracies in our sample with prior democratic
experience, none fail during our period of analysis. Post-World War II Japan, however,
experienced no prior democratic experience, and yet the model still forecasts a very high
probability of its durability. These forecasts are driven by Japan’s very low level of ethnic
divisions and comparatively high level of economic development. Each of these conditions pushes
toward more durable imposed democracy. West Germany also benefits from each of these
conditions, with an even higher level of economic development and limited ethnic divisions.40

This analysis puts Afghanistan at a disadvantage on account of several factors. They highlight
these as, “Neither Iraq nor Afghanistan has any prior democratic experience. Both countries have
substantially more ethnic divisions than Japan and West Germany faced during their imposition
process. The level of economic development in both Iraq and Afghanistan is substantially lower
than either West Germany or Japan, a challenge that is particularly acute in Afghanistan which is
among the poorest countries in the world.”41 These factors are all significant contributors to the
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potential failure of an imposed democracy in Afghanistan, and require further examination to
determine which methods should be taken to ensure democratic success.
One of the most influential factors affecting the success of imposed democracies is a
previous history of democracy in the nation. Initially, this provides a bleak forecast for the
outcome in Afghanistan. However, it may be incorrect to say that Afghanistan has had no
previous experience with democracy. Biddle, Fotini, and Thier examine the history of
Afghanistan in this regard:
From the end of the Second Anglo-Afghan War in 1880 to the coup of Mohammad Daud Khan in
1973, Afghanistan underwent a relatively stable and gradual period of state building. Although the
country was an absolute monarchy until 1964, Afghanistan's emirs, on the whole, needed the
acquiescence of the population in order to govern. The central government lacked the strength and
resources to exercise local control or provide public goods in many parts of the country. Instead, it
ruled according to a series of bargains between the state and individual communities, exchanging
relative autonomy for fealty and a modicum of order.42

While this system of governance is definitively not in line with western conceptions of
democracy, it does prove that Afghanistan has historically been capable of stable centralized
governance. In fact, this stability remained until the first major foreign intervention in
Afghanistan in the twentieth century- the invasion by the Soviet Union. Biddle, Fotini, and Thier
state, “The Soviet invasion in 1979 led to a fundamental breakdown of centralized authority and
legitimacy, which resulted in the diffusion of political, economic, and military power across a
number of ethnic and geographic groups.”43 Based on the history of Afghanistan as a nation, it is
not feasible to expect a successful centralized democracy, but that doesn’t mean that intervention
efforts have been a waste. Simply put, by abandoning the dream of a centralized democracy in
Afghanistan, the international community can move forward with taking steps towards creating
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stability in the nation. Biddle, Fotini, and Thier state, “Afghanistan could become a centralized
democracy, a decentralized democracy, a regulated mix of democratic and nondemocratic
territories, a partitioned collection of ministates, an anarchy, or a centralized dictatorship. The
first and the last are unlikely; partition and anarchy are unacceptable. But decentralized
democracy and internal mixed sovereignty are both feasible and acceptable.”44 Afghanistan is a
nation distinct from both Germany and Japan in many aspects essential to democracy building.
Therefore, the bar for a stabilized government within a specific time-frame cannot be set at the
same level for each of these nations.
Additionally, the economic framework of Afghanistan, as well as the diversity in the
ethnic makeup of its citizenry, are factors unlikely to change any time in the near future. In
response to these challenges, Biddle, Fotini, and Thier again offer their solution of working
towards a less centralized form of government for Afghanistan. They state, “... the current model
of Afghan governance is too radical a departure in a place where the central state has such
limited legitimacy and capacity. To create a lasting peace that includes the country's main ethnic
and sectarian groups- as well as elements of the insurgency- Afghanistan will require a more
inclusive, flexible, and decentralized political arrangement.”45 This is not to discourage the idea
of an Afghanistan that is able to implement a “western style democracy.” However, the current
evidence shows that attempting to implement such a distinct form of government in Afghanistan
is destined for failure. In order to achieve stability and lay groundwork for future democratic
developments, concessions must be made.
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3.2.2. Moving Beyond “One Size Fits All”
One of the main hindrances to U.S. democracy promotion abroad is the insistent use of a
“cookie cutter” approach. Matthew Hill examines this phenomenon explicitly in his article,
"Exploring USAID's democracy promotion in Bosnia and Afghanistan: a ‘cookie-cutter
approach’?." By comparing the process of democracy building in the radically different states of
Bosnia and Afghanistan, Hill is able to critique this approach taken by the United States. He
states:
In spite of the different contextual situations for USAID’s engagement, the two US presidents in
Bosnia and Afghanistan supported the same sub-programme areas which strengthened the media
in order for it to be more independent, introduced the mechanisms necessary for free and fair
elections, supported the growth of plural politics, obtained public accountability of the government
by developing its civil society, developed an independent judiciary, and developed checks and
balances to deter arbitrary power by instituting accountable local and national government.46

Initially, these methods of democracy promotion seem to be applicable to most cases of foreign
interventions. However, the failure within them becomes more evident in the later stages,
especially when considering the eventual outcomes. At present, Bosnia is undoubtedly a more
stable nation than Afghanistan, despite the fact that U.S. approaches to both nations were almost
identical. Hill states, “... the differences in sub-programme and project design indicate that the
way that policies were implemented did at times differ according to conditions on the ground.
However, the eventual goal did not differ. Ultimately, the US was still applying a cookie-cutter
approach to democratization.”47 Ignoring the specificities of each case study does a disservice to
both the imposing nation and the target nation. By increasing the potential for a failed state, the
United States is not only squandering their own nation’s resources, but also stunting the
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development of other nations. However, the more specific the approach, the more resources it
requires. Hill also addresses this aspect:
... a genuinely case-specific strategy will make this adaptation but will also consider the local
voices in the mission design. In this case, USAID would not only have to acknowledge that the
local conditions require the infrastructural development and training of technicians, journalists,
distributors, and production workers but also that it tailor its support to the needs of the local
community. This type of mission design listens to local voices and culture on what, where, and
how the media package is to be implemented.48

Such an approach would require more physical involvement by the United States in Afghanistan.
However, this method is seldom implemented because of this strain on time and resources. In
democracy building, there are no sufficient “quick fixes.” Moving forward, imposing nations
need to fully commit to the full cost of democracy building abroad, before engaging with target
nations.
3.2.3. Changing Methods of Implementation
So, in the continued interest of promoting democracy, how should nations like the
United States work around challenges like those seen in Afghanistan? The short answer is by
working from the “bottom-up.” Hill again challenges the “cookie cutter” approach in this regard:
Korten criticizes USAID’s decision-making process in its cultural development programmes. He
compares this top-down process unfavourably to a bottom-up approach which designs projects and
programmes through immediate and constant engagement with the community at the grassroots
level. Projects by USAID can be deployed at the grassroots level within its top-down
organizational framework, but responsibility for design and implementation stays with USAID and
is not placed at the door of the community.49

By not implementing community engagement as part of the democratization process, the U.S. is
severely diminishing its probability of success in Afghanistan. In such an ethnically
heterogeneous nation, local support is essential to bringing legitimacy to an imposed democracy.
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This ideology closely ties into evidence from Bidder, Fotini, and Thier. They discuss the
importance of local governance in Afghan society, and its successes in bringing stability to the
nation. They state:
... local communities remain a fundamental source of Afghan identity and a critical base of
governance and accountability. This is especially clear in the case of the local jirga or shura
(community council). Traditionally, the community council was a place to solve problems and
negotiate over common goods and burdens, with its more prominent members serving as liaisons
to the central government. These bodies may differ in their power and representation, but they are
still found today in virtually every community. This traditional and local base of legitimacy offers
a potential foundation for stable governance in the future.50

By not exploring the nuances of the cultural identity specific to Afghanistan, the United States is
actively ignoring a valuable resource to aid in their mission. As stated, the acceptance of the
target nation is mandatory for an imposed democracy to be accepted. Following this ideology,
including the input of the local communities in this process, and collaborating with these groups
through the transition will aid the success of the new democracy. Bidder, Fotini, and Thier state:
Increasing local autonomy would make it easier to win over Afghans who distrust distant Kabul
and would take advantage of a preexisting base of legitimacy and identity at the local level. The
responsibility for foreign policy and internal security, however, would remain with the central
government, which would prevent even the more autonomous territories from hosting international
terrorist groups or supporting insurrection against the state.51

Evidence has shown that organic democracies are statistically more likely to succeed than
imposed democracies. Through the inclusion of the grassroots communities of the target nation
in the democratic process, the imposing nation can most accurately imitate the conditions of an
organic democracy.
For the United States in Afghanistan, the success of democracy building serves two
purposes. Similarly to the events that prompted the U.S. to engage in Chile during the Cold War,
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the United States has deep national security concerns regarding Afghanistan. Bidder, Fotini, and
Thier outline these concerns as, “... the United States' two main security interests in Afghanistan
that justify waging a war are much narrower: one, that terrorists who wish to strike the United
States and its allies not use Afghanistan as their base, and two, that insurgent groups not use
Afghanistan's territory to destabilize its neighbors, especially Pakistan.”52 Therefore, it is even
more in-line with U.S. interests to consider the most effective methods to work towards success
in Afghanistan. There is ample evidence to support that terrorists are more frequently fostered in
hostile and unstable environments. Gaining the acceptance of the Afghan people for a central
government would not only diminish the chaos within the nation, but also create a stable
foundation for the nation. Bidder, Fotini, and Thier state, “By promoting local acceptance of the
central government, this option would remove much of the casus belli for the insurgency. And it
would preserve a central state with the power and incentive to deny the use of Afghan soil for
destabilizing Pakistan or planning attacks against the United States.”53 The United States began
engaging with Afghanistan out of fear for its national security. However, its current methods of
democracy promotion in this target nation have proved unsuccessful. A disregard for examining
past cases of foreign intervention have allowed the United States to repeat mistakes in regard to
democracy building abroad.
In order to fully achieve their goals of democracy promotion the United States must learn
from the past. The United States has ample evidence and case studies of what methods do and do
not work in the case of foreign interventions, and in which scenarios to implement each method.
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In the case of Afghanistan this is most evident with the lack of engagement with the grassroots
communities of the target nation. The U.S. has seen this through its past attempts at foreign
intervention, the approval and cooperation of the target nation is essential to the success of a new
democracy. Brownlee states, “Sooner or later, whether in victory (Japan) or defeat (Vietnam),
U.S. presidents defer to the power of the local society.”54 The U.S. is aware of which methods
work in the long-run, but these methods are generally more time consuming and labor intensive
for the United States. However, this type of intervention seen in Afghanistan, lacking the
knowledge of the nuances of the circumstances affecting a nation, led to the U.S. being involved
in the target nation in a seventeen year long war that is still ongoing.
4. Comparing case studies
As previously stated in this paper, the case studies of Chile and Afghanistan initially
appear to have few, if any, connections. It's impossible to ignore the differences that come
inherently with the differing nature of each case study. However, there are similarities amongst
the different approaches taken in each nation.
4.1 Analyzing differences
The most obvious differing factor between the case study in Chile and that of
Afghanistan is the contrast between the use of covert and overt operations. In Chile, the United
States intentionally worked to depose a democratically elected leader. Then, when there was
outrage from the international community, the U.S. denied any involvement in the operations.
The United States was able to do so because there was never any formal or overt military
operations that coincided with the coup operation. Post-coup, the extent of U.S. involvement in
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Chile was relegated solely to propaganda promotion of the state and economic support.
Conversely, in Afghanistan the U.S. operations were almost exclusively overt. There were
instances of covert operations in the form of arms sales during the Soviet-Afghan war, which
lasted until 1989. However, the primary form of intervention by the United States was prolonged
military involvement. This began in 2001, when the United States formally declared to be at war
with Afghanistan, and is lasting into today in the year 2018. There was never any denial of U.S.
efforts in Afghanistan.
The differing nature inherent between covert and overt operations leads into the next
disparity between the two case studies; the length of involvement. In Chile, the U.S. had a
relatively short-term and limited involvement. It was involved in the creation of a coup-climate
to aid the ousting of Allende and again later in their efforts to prop up Pinochet’s regime.
However, in Afghanistan the length of U.S. involvement in considerably more long-term. Due to
the fact that U.S. operations in Afghanistan were more militarily focused, the length and scope of
the involvement were both increased. Therefore, not only did the efforts of the U.S. in Chile have
a comparatively shorter time frame than those efforts in Afghanistan, but the financial costs
related to resources and manpower were also severely lessened.
Additionally, another factor contributing to the differences between interventions in Chile
and those in Afghanistan are the contrasting ethnic demographics of each nation. As previously
discussed, democracy building tends to be more successful in states with relatively high ethnic
homogeneity. In Afghanistan, the are multitudes of different tribes and ethnic groups, which can
cause social cleavages. These cleavages often present obstacles for building and maintaining
stable democratic systems. Contrastingly, Chile has a relatively high rate of ethnic homogeneity
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within its nation. This results in a lack of social cleavages, and allows for an easier facilitation of
the democratic process. However, as stated by Greig and Enterline:
Imposed democracy need not be doomed in multiethnic societies. History is replete with durable
democracies in multiethnic states such as Canada, Belgium, the United States, and India. A
tradition of democracy can increase the durability of imposed democracy. Our analysis is
consistent with this logic, as a host state’s prior experience with democracy exerts the strongest
substantive impact on imposed democracy survival relative to any other causal factor specified in
our models.55

Therefore, evidence shows that it is not impossible to create democracies in nations with high
rates of ethnic heterogeneity, it is just simply a more difficult process. This citation also leads
well into another substantial contrasting element between the Chile and Afghanistan case studies.
The final major separating factor in U.S. approaches in Chile and Afghanistan analyzed
in this paper are the differing stages of the prior development in each target nation. The most
prominent of these is the prior experience with democracy in both nations. Chile was an
established and functional democracy prior to U.S. interventions. Therefore, despite its period of
regression during the Pinochet regime, Chile never completely destabilized and was able to
return to its status as a democratic state after a rebuilding period. On the contrary, Afghanistan
has had limited experience in its history with centralized government, much less a functioning
democracy. Therefore, when the U.S. attempted to instantaneously instill democratic institutions,
the process was met with backlash. In addition, Chile also had a substantially more robust
economy than Afghanistan. This further gave a more successful outlook for the prospects for
democracy in Chile over Afghanistan. Enterline and Greig state, “Afghanistan is disadvantaged
not only by the process by which democracy was imposed, but also be their demographic
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characteristics that undermine the durability of imposed democracy.”56 These characteristics
explain why democracy was already able to exist in Chile, prior to the instances of U.S.
interventions. It also explains why the nation of Afghanistan had an inherently more unstable
response to U.S. attempts at intervention.
5. Drawing Connections
Despite the glaring differences between the case studies of Chile and Afghanistan, there
are several commonalities that remained present in U.S. approaches and interventions. The first
can be seen through the lack in knowledge of the political and social history of both target
nations. In Afghanistan, U.S. officials were largely unaware of the deep ethnic divides that are
present in the nation, and even more so of the ramifications that this element would have
regarding the democracy building process. Additionally, the U.S. did not factor in the lack of
prior democratic experience in Afghanistan’s history when planning their intervention process.
U.S. officials also did not account for the lack of economic resources in Afghanistan that are
required for the creation and maintenance of democratic institutions. These factors all
contributed to the U.S. being ill-prepared for the lengthy and taxing process that a democratic
intervention in Afghanistan would require. This lack of preparedness for the reality of the
democracy building process in Afghanistan caused the U.S. to fall short in its implementation,
creating a weak foundation for democracy that ultimately stunted the democratic process in
Afghanistan. Greig and Enterline discuss this concept:
... a similar tendency during American interventions into counterinsurgency wars. Our previous
research (Enterline and Greig 2005) corroborates these incentives by imposers, showing that
weakly democratic imposed regimes undermine peace, prosperity, and democracy in neighboring
states. The durability of imposed democracy, in general, like indigenous democracies, is tied to the
strength of democratic institutions, the degree of economic prosperity and the minimization of
Enterline, Andrew J., and J. Michael Greig. "Against All Odds?: The History of Imposed Democracy and the
Future of Iraq and Afghanistan." Foreign Policy Analysis 4, no. 4 (2008): 321-347.
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ethnic cleavages (Enterline and Greig 2008). Furthermore, the failure of imposed democracy
retards the subsequent reemergence of democracy.57

The literature shows that when democratic interventions fail, they ultimately end, or at least
stunt, the process of democratization in the target nation. This resulting concept is also seen in
the Chile case.
Conversely from the Afghanistan case, Chile did have experience with democratic
system. This would imply that it would be easier for nations to promote democracy in Chile
because it would not be a new concept, and the institutions required for a functioning democracy
would already be established. However, since Chile already had an organic democracy, the
nation would be similarly unlikely to accept a foreign imposed government. This is especially
true for a foreign imposed government with autocratic policies that the prior system did not
exhibit. The democratic process was well underway in Chile, however, the United States did not
support the election of Salvador Allende. This was purely for reasons of personal preference on
behalf of the United States, as it believed Allende to be too much in agreement with socialist
ideology. Therefore, fear for national security, heightened by events of the Cold War, prompted
the United States to intervene in both Chile and Afghanistan. In Chile, a democratic process was
halted, and in Afghanistan democratic institutions were poorly implemented. In both cases, this
left room to foster autocracy. This is not a new phenomenon, as discussed by Enterline and
Greig, “Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (2006) offer a logic for the latter set of findings, arguing
that a strong preference for reliable foreign policy allies leads democratic imposers to backslide
on their commitment to build democracy in target states. In turn, democratic backsliding
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encourages the emergence of authoritarian regimes.”58 In the onset of its democratic
interventions the United States was primarily concerned with its own political agenda and
national security interests. This led to an upheaval of the governmental systems of the respective
target nations in each case study, as well as the propping up of and support for autocracies.
Therefore, U.S. desire for immediate stability trumped its original objective to create liberal
democracies. Instead, in Chile it settled for stable autocracies that it could count on to remain an
ally to the United States, and in Afghanistan it settled for prolonged occupation that has yielded
no results.
5.1 Following the “Cookie Cutter” Implementation
Additionally, the United States continued the implementation of its traditional “cookie
cutter” methods for democracy building in both Chile and Afghanistan. After the coup in Chile,
the nation was in a precarious position. As a result of the coup-climate created by the United
States, Chile could easily have slipped into disarray. Therefore, in order to force stability in
Chile, the U.S. chose Pinochet to be its preferred candidate for the Chilean presidency. This was
all despite the fact that Augusto Pinochet rapidly began to exhibit authoritarian tendencies.
Therefore, the U.S. was complicit in Pinochet creating a personalized militaristic dictatorship,
with the operations being executed by the Chilean military. This was done without the consent or
knowledge of the vast majority of Chileans, and was not accepted. While Pinochet did bring
stability to Chile, in the sense that Chile did not reach the status of a failed state, it is near
impossible to argue that Chile as a nation was improved by U.S. intervention. At the very least, it
certainly was not more liberal or more democratic.
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Similarly, in Afghanistan case study there was also a clear mentality that a new
governmental system and democratic institutions could simply be imposed on a nation. Little to
no research was done by the U.S. on on the social and political history of Afghanistan prior to its
intervention. There was also almost no contact with Afghan citizens prior to the initial stages of
the democracy building process. It is nothing more than hubris for an imposing nation to simply
assume the most successful method for implementing the democracy building process in a target
nation. Bumiller addresses this false notion of simplicity in his article, “We Have Met the Enemy
and He Is PowerPoint.” He describes the popularized method among U.S. officials of using an
obscene amount of powerpoints in an attempt to impart knowledge and plan interventions. He
describes the infamous slide that claims to hold the key to U.S. success in Afghanistan:
Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the leader of American and NATO forces in Afghanistan, was shown
a PowerPoint slide in Kabul last summer that was meant to portray the complexity of American
military strategy, but looked more like a bowl of spaghetti. “When we understand that slide, we’ll
have won the war,” General McChrystal dryly remarked, one of his advisers recalled, as the room
erupted in laughter.59

Even members of the U.S. military are aware of the lack of progress to be made by studying
powerpoints created by other U.S. personel. There is little to be gained in this aspect, much less
practical application to be fostered by it. Methods such as powerpoint lectures leave little room
for unexpected events and obstacles to the democratic process. Additionally, heavily structured
powerpoint flow-charts inherently operate on the idea that people and nations are predictable and
will act accordingly. This is an unlikely occurrence, especially when the specific nuances of the
target nation are not taken into account. Bumiller also discusses this issue:
“It’s dangerous because it can create the illusion of understanding and the illusion of control,”
General McMaster said in a telephone interview afterward. “Some problems in the world are not
bullet-izable.” In General McMaster’s view, PowerPoint’s worst offense is not a chart like the
spaghetti graphic, which was first uncovered by NBC’s Richard Engel, but rigid lists of bullet
Bumiller, E. (2010, April 27). We Have Met the Enemy and He Is PowerPoint. Retrieved from
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points (in, say, a presentation on a conflict’s causes) that take no account of interconnected
political, economic and ethnic forces. “If you divorce war from all of that, it becomes a targeting
exercise,” General McMaster said.60

It is impossible to accurately understand and react to a situation without full knowledge of all
aspects surrounding the case. By separating the issue of the war itself from deeper social and
political strife in Afghanistan, the United States is effectively negating any chance it had at a
successful intervention. The process of democracy building is not simple or easily implemented
in any case study. Ignoring the nuances of target nations that would have a direct effect on such a
process only further complicates the transition. Enterline and Greig have analyzed in depth the
necessity of collaboration with the target nation itself in the process of democracy building. They
state:
... democratization via foreign imposition is a fragile process. This fragility is likely to be all the
more case among imposed democracies because of the low level of institutional legitimacy that
their foreign source engenders. To the degree to which the imposed democratic regime is
considered illegitimate or as a tool of an external power, said regime will be less likely to survive.
Furthermore, social cleavages, such as religious and ethnic fractionalization, undercut the
survivability of imposed democratic regimes.61

Along with the conduction of diplomacy and funds allocated to democracy promotion, the U.S.
has also used forced imposition as a prominent method for democracy building and promotion.
This method is inherently incompatible with creating a successful atmosphere for democracy in
several case studies. The evidence shows that in Chile and Afghanistan, both nations did not
benefit from U.S. democracy promotion in this way. The attempted forms of government were
not accepted, and autocracy was allowed to rule in Chile, while instability festers in Afghanistan.
6. Democracy as a Lengthy Process
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Democracy building is a lengthy process, without a clear linear trajectory. A major
obstacle that frequently occurs in U.S. foreign interventions is that it doesn’t accept the push and
pull that naturally occurs along this transition. Sheri Berman outlines the deviations that often
occur during the democratic process in her article, "The promise of the Arab Spring: In political
development, no gain without pain." Berman’s article focuses specifically on the Middle East
and on the democratic transitions of the nations in the region after the Arab Spring. However, she
analyzes the broader process of democracy building as a whole, and uses historical evidence
from the emergence of European democracies. Therefore, her theory can be made applicable to
the democratic transition on a global scale. Berman states:
... critics also set absurdly high benchmarks for success, ones that lack any historical perspective.
They interpret post-transition violence, corruption, confusion, and incompetence as signs that
particular countries (or even entire regions or religions) are not ready for democracy, as if normal
democratic transitions lead smoothly and directly to stable liberal outcomes and countries that
stumble along the way must have something wrong with them. In fact, stable liberal democracy
usually emerges only at the end of long, often violent struggles, with many twists, turns, false
starts, and detours.62

Democracy is a messy process, so analyses of new democracies should treat it as such. It is not
feasible to expect democracies to simply gain traction and acceptance immediately, especially
those that are imposed by a foreign power. When applied to the case studies of Chile and
Afghanistan, there is ample evidence to support Berman’s thinking. In Chile there was a
functioning democratic political system. The United States, however, viewed the election of a
socialist president to be a sign of the collapse of Chilean liberal democracy. This mentality
elucidates the fear that has stoked many U.S. interventions. There was no evidence of a threat to
the democracy of Chile, and U.S. intervention was not necessary in that aspect. If anything, the
United States should have viewed Allende’s election, at worst, to be a “bump in the road” of
Berman, Sheri. "The promise of the Arab Spring: In political development, no gain without pain." Foreign Aff. 92
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Chile’s path to democracy. Certainly, not cause for a full-scale covert operation ending in a coup
and an authoritarian dictatorship.
In Afghanistan, the United States has set the bar too high for what is possible, and can be
expected from an emerging democracy in the nation. Afghanistan cannot be expected to make a
full transition to a centralized, liberal democracy in a mere few years. The only options the
United States has are; to accept the necessary duration of this transition and continue to provide
time, energy, and resources into Afghanistan, or to amend the expectations and goals of its
intervention and settle for initial steps that will help foster an organic democratic transition. It is
expected, if not normal, for Afghanistan to be experiencing struggles and upheavals along its
course to democracy. However, this does not mean that an Afghan democracy is impossible. The
process simply takes time.
7. Conclusion
The question then becomes- what now? Reviewing these analyses, how can the United
States best implement foreign interventions for democratic development? The evidence shows
that working from a “bottom-up” method of intervention is essential. Without the support and
acceptance of the local communities, an imposed democracy is unlikely to flourish. Additionally,
the United States should begin to accept the limitations inherent to democracy promotion abroad.
In his article, “The Imperative of State-Building,” Fukuyama discusses what the “ideal”
democracy would look like, based on successful European examples like Denmark. He also
analyzes the profound limitations that state’s have in transplanting democracies abroad.
Fukuyama states:
We know by and large… what a Denmark-like solution would be; the problem is that we do not
have the political means of arriving there because there is insufficient local demand for reform.
Well-meaning developed countries have tried a variety of strategies for stimulating such local
demand, from loan conditionality to outright military occupation. The record, however, if we look
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at it honestly, is not an impressive one, and in many cases our interventions have actually made
things worse.63

The process of democracy building is intense and prolonged. Most nations are not able to
commit the full array of time and resources that a successful democratic intervention would
require, this includes the United States. Therefore, it is critical for nations to seriously reevaluate
their capabilities in foreign interventions and their capacities to intervene in the affairs of other
nations. This is not to say that the U.S. should never intervene abroad on behalf of democracy.
However, full-scale democratic interventions have proven largely unsuccessful, and even
damaging to the international community. No nation has a perfected, or even largely successful,
method for democratic interventions in the twenty first century. The United States can, and
should, continue to support grassroots democratic movements in nations transitioning towards
democracy. However, large-scale foreign interventions with the objective of imposing
democratic governance should be an ideological goal that is left in the past.

63

Fukuyama, Francis. "The imperative of state-building." Journal of democracy 15, no. 2 (2004): 17-31.

42

Bibliography
Alemán, José. "ISSF Article Review 73 on "Domestic Opposition and the Timing of Democratic
Transitions after War."" H-Diplo | ISSF. April 02, 2017. Accessed November 02, 2018.
https://issforum.org/articlereviews/73-opposition.
Berman, Sheri. "The promise of the Arab Spring: In political development, no gain without
pain." Foreign Aff. 92 (2013): 64.
Biddle, Stephen, Fotini Christia, and F. Alexander Thier. "Defining success in Afghanistan-What
can the United States accept." Foreign Aff. 89 (2010): 48.
Bumiller, E. (2010, April 27). We Have Met the Enemy and He Is PowerPoint. Retrieved from
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/27/world/27powerpoint.html
Enterline, Andrew J., and J. Michael Greig. "Against All Odds?: The History of Imposed
Democracy and the Future of Iraq and Afghanistan." Foreign Policy Analysis 4, no. 4 (2008):
321-347.
Greig, J. Michael, and Andrew J. Enterline. "The Durability of Imposed Democracy."
International Interactions 40, no. 2 (2014): 166-190.
Fukuyama, Francis. "The imperative of state-building." Journal of democracy 15, no. 2 (2004):
17-31.
Hill, Matthew Alan. "Exploring USAID's democracy promotion in Bosnia and Afghanistan: a
‘cookie-cutter approach’?." Democratization 17, no. 1 (2010): 98-124.
Inglehart, Ronald. Cultural Evolution: People's Motivations are Changing, and Reshaping the
World. Cambridge University Press, 2018.
Johnson, Thomas H., and M. Chris Mason. "Democracy in Afghanistan is wishful thinking."
(2009).
Kornbluh, P. (2013). The Pinochet file: A declassified dossier on atrocity and accountability.
New York: The New Press.
McFaul, Michael. Advancing democracy abroad: why we should and how we can. Rowman &
Littlefield, 2009.
Von Hippel, Karin. "Democracy by force: A renewed commitment to nation building."
Washington Quarterly 23, no. 1 (2000): 95-112.

